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Resumo 
O possível escopo da proposta de “Instrumento Internacional Legalmente 
Vinculante de Corporações Transnacionais e outros Empreendimentos 
Comerciais em relação a Direitos Humanos” a ser discutida no Conselho de 
Direitos Humanos é uma das principais questões que determinarão a 
probabilidade de se chegar a um acordo efetivo em um tempo razoável. 
Este artigo argumenta que o escopo de tal Instrumento deveria ser definido 
tendo em vista o objetivo pretendido do dito instrumento: resolver as 
questões levantadas pela habilidade das corporações transnacionais (e 
outras empresas) em usar suas complexas estruturas para escapar da 
responsabilização por violações de direitos humanos. 
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Abstract 
The possible scope of the proposed ‘International Legally Binding 
Instrument on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises 
with respect to Human Rights’ to be discussed at the Human Rights Council, 
is one of the key issues that will determine the likelihood of reaching an 
effective agreement within a reasonable time. This paper argues that the 
scope of said Instrument should be defined having in view the intended 
objective of said instrument: to resolve the issues raised by the ability of 
transnational corporations (and other businesses) to use their complex 
structures to escape the responsibility for human rights’ violations. 
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Resumen 
El posible alcance de la propuesta de un “Instrumento Internacional 
Legalmente Vinculante de Corporaciones Transnacionales y otros 
Emprendimientos Comerciales con relación a Derechos Humanos” que va 
ser discutida en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos es una de las principales 
cuestiones que determinarán la probabilidad de se llegar a un acuerdo 
efectivo en un tiempo razonable. Este artículo argumenta que el alcance de 
tal Instrumento debería ser definido teniéndose en cuenta el objetivo 
pretendido por el dicho instrumento: resolver las cuestiones que surgen 
por la habilidad de las corporaciones transnacionales (y otras empresas) en 
utilizar sus complejas estructuras para escapar de la responsabilización por 
violaciones de derechos humanos. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The elaboration of an ‘International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights’ (hereinafter ‘the 
Instrument’), as mandated by the Human Rights Council at its 26º Ordinary Session (June 26th, 2014),1 
requires definitions  about a multiplicity of issues. Many choices need to be made among possible 
policy options and properly reflect them in treaty language.  
This paper2 addresses one of such issues: the subjective scope of the Instrument, that is, 
whose conduct will be subject to the disciplines eventually incorporated therein. 
2. INTERPRETING THE MANDATE 
Resolution A/HRC/26/9 adopted a mandate to ‘elaborate an international legally binding 
instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises’ (para. 1). While the Resolution does not define what is meant by 
‘transnational corporations’, in a footnote it indicates that 
“Other business enterprises” denotes all business enterprises that have a transnational 
character in their operational activities, and does not apply to local businesses registered in 
terms of relevant domestic law.”3 
The expression ‘business enterprises’ appears in previous resolutions by the Human Rights 
Council and other instruments. Notably, the "Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework" (UNGPs)4 and the 
‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights’5 (hereinafter ‘the Norms’) have adopted this terminology. The Norms, 
moreover, utilizes the same wording (‘transnational corporations and other business enterprises’) 
incorporated into said Resolution.  
The wording of the Resolution’s footnote seems to suggest that the intended scope of the 
Instrument is narrower than that of the UNGPs, since the Resolution specifically alludes to the 
‘transnational character’ of the enterprises’ operations. The Resolution’s mandate rather seems to 
align itself with the scope of the Norms. In accordance with the Norms, 
“The phrase ‘other business enterprise’ includes any business entity, regardless of the 
international or domestic nature of its activities, including a transnational corporation, 
                                                                
1
 See Resolution A/HRC/26/9, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G14/064/48/PDF/G1406448.pdf?OpenElement.  
2
 The paper is based on the presentation made by the author at the first session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working 
Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights (Genva, 6 to 10 July 2015); 
it also incorporates reflections from the statements made and discussions held during that session. 
3
 The fact that this clarification is contained in a footnote does not diminish its legal weight in determining the scope of the 
mandate. In accordance with the international customary law principle of ‘effective interpretation’, the interpreter shall take 
into account all the provisions in a way that gives meaning to all of them, harmoniously. See, e.g., the WTO Appellate Body 
report in Korea — Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, para. 81 (available at 
docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds98/ab/r*%20not%20rw*)&Language=E
NGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true#). 
4
 Available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 
5
 Approved August 13, 2003, by U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights resolution 2003/16, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 at 52 (2003). Source: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html.  
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contractor, subcontractor, supplier, licensee or distributor; the corporate, partnership, or 
other legal form used to establish the business entity; and the nature of the ownership of 
the entity. These Norms shall be presumed to apply, as a matter of practice, if the business 
enterprise has any relation with a transnational corporation, the impact of its activities is 
not entirely local, or the activities involve violations of the right to security as indicated in 
paragraphs 3 and 4 (para. 21).”  
‘Business enterprises’ may be deemed to comprise any private actor involved in commercial 
activities,6 including manufacturing, distribution, storage and transportation. Resolution A/HRC/26/9 
clarifies, however, that the intended scope of the Instrument is not to cover all business enterprises 
but only a particular category thereof: those ‘that have a transnational character in their operational 
activities’.  The key element in this concept is the geographical reach of the enterprises’ activities, 
irrespective of whether the ownership or control of the enterprise is concentrated in one or more 
countries.  
An enterprise owned or controlled by stakeholders residing in a country may have operations 
of a ‘transnational character’ if it engages in business activities through an affiliate, subsidiary or a 
controlled undertaking in another country. To the extent that the primary objective of the Instrument 
would be, as discussed below, to avoid the use of corporate and contractual structures to escape 
responsibility in case of human rights’ violations, these concepts may be understood as encompassing 
any situation of foreign ownership or control of a business enterprise. The concept of ‘operational 
activities’ would seem to indicate, however, that the ownership of an undertaking would not be the 
sole determining factor for inclusion under the proposed Instrument. The conduct by domestically 
owned companies that, for instance, act as sub-contractors or licensees of a transnational corporation 
would also be covered. 7 
3. A BROAD SCOPE: ALL BUSINESS ENTERPRISES? 
It has been argued that the scope of the Instrument should be broadly defined so as to 
encompass any business enterprise,8 whether it is a small or large entity, with national or 
transnational activities, foreign or locally, state or privately, owned. For instance, one statement 
submitted to the first session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the Working 
Group’) argued that 
“Business enterprises that do not have any or any significant transnational operations no 
doubt are capable of and in many instances have been responsible for human rights abuses 
no less serious in scale or severity than those of transnational businesses. The people whose 
human rights are abused directly or indirectly by businesses are unlikely to distinguish 
whether the business enterprise that causes them harm has transnational ownership or 
                                                                
6
 See Oxford Dictionary, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/business. 
7
 The Norms, for instance, provide that ‘[e]ach transnational corporation or other business enterprise shall apply and 
incorporate these Norms in their contracts or other arrangements and dealings with contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, 
licensees, distributors, or natural or other legal persons who enter into any agreement with the transnational corporation or 
business enterprise in order to ensure respect for and implementation of the Norms’ (para. 15). 
8
 See, e.g., Oral statement by Colombian Commission of Jurists about the General Principles and objectives of the future treaty 
on TNCs and other business Enterprises, submitted to the first session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group 
on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights (6 to 10 July 2015), available 
at  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Statements.aspx 
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operations; nor are affected people likely to excuse abuses they suffer from a “local” 
business simply because the entity lacks a transnational element. From the point of view of 
those whose human rights are affected by business activities, the key consideration is not 
the formal character of the business entity, but instead the their practical access to 
effective remedy and reparation for the harm they have suffered.  
If a treaty is going to take the views and needs of those adversely affected by business 
activity as a central concern, it must address all business enterprises that can potentially 
carry out abuses and not only on those with transnational links.” 9 
It is indisputable that human rights violations may be committed by enterprises whose 
operations are merely domestic. The principle that all business enterprises’ are bound to respect all 
human rights has been universally accepted; it is one of the pillars of the UNGPs and has been 
reaffirmed in several Resolutions of the Human Rights Council. However, a key question in drafting 
the Instrument is whether such a broad coverage would be within the mandate given by Resolution 
A/HRC/26/9 and whether that would be the right approach in order to develop and adopt, in a 
reasonable time, an instrument that effectively addresses the concerns raised by the proponents of 
the Instrument. 
These concerns relate to situations where transnational corporations and other entities with 
transnational activities are capable of evading their human rights’ responsibilities on jurisdictional 
grounds. There is a growing number of cases in which complaints relating to human rights violations 
by transnational corporations have been brought to courts in the corporations’ home State or other 
States different from the State where the harm was caused. Pursuing such cases in a foreign 
jurisdiction requires complainants to overcome a number of obstacles, such as finding legal 
representation, bearing the fees of legal experts and attorneys, and securing access to information 
held by the defendant. But even if these obstacles are overcome, the legal actions may be dismissed 
by the courts without considering their merits, on jurisdictional reasons only, such as in the case of 
the action brought before the Quebec Court for acts of Omai Gold Mines Limited, a Canadian 
subsidiary operating in Guyana, and the case brought before US courts against Union Carbide 
Corporation following the Bhopal gas leak disaster. 10  
As noted by the UNGPs, 
“At present States are not generally required under international human rights law to 
regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction. Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized 
jurisdictional basis. Within these parameters some human rights treaty bodies recommend 
that home States take steps to prevent abuse abroad by business enterprises within their 
jurisdiction”.11 
The UNGPs also notes that some States have adopted several measures with extraterritorial 
implications to address human rights abuses, such as  
                                                                
9
 Joint Oral Statement on the Scope of the Legally Binding Instrument: TNCs and other Business Enterprises submitted to the 
first session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with respect to Human Rights (6 to 10 July 2015), available at  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Statements.aspx. 
10
 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Injustice incorporated: Corporate abuses and the human right to remedy. By Amnesty 
International, 7 March 2014, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/POL30/001/2014/en/, p. 122-126. 
11
 UNGPs, p.3-4. 
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“requirements on ‘parent’ companies to report on the global operations of the entire 
enterprise; multilateral soft-law instruments such as the Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; and 
performance standards required by institutions that support overseas investments. Other 
approaches amount to direct extraterritorial legislation and enforcement. This includes 
criminal regimes that allow for prosecutions based on the nationality of the perpetrator no 
matter where the offence occurs. Various factors may contribute to the perceived and 
actual reasonableness of States’ actions, for example whether they are grounded in 
multilateral agreement.”12 
These measures, however, are insufficient and do not provide a generally applicable and 
robust framework to give redress to the victims of human right violations in a foreign jurisdiction. 
There are no international binding rules allowing for the determination of liability of parent and 
controlling companies under the jurisdiction of states other than those of the affected communities. 
This is the fundamental gap that the Instrument is intended to address, as reiterated by many 
delegations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at the first meeting of the Working Group.13 
This objective is complementary but different from one aiming at reinforcing compliance with human 
rights’ States obligations in respect of all business enterprises, including domestic undertakings. 
Extending the scope of the Instrument to all business enterprises would not only be beyond 
the mandate given by Resolution A/HRC/26/9 but would mean to open a long negotiating process 
with uncertain outcomes. If the objective of the Instrument is to address the referred to gap in the 
international legal system, negotiations must focus in finding viable solutions. The argument that a 
new international treaty should be applicable to a myriad of small and large domestic businesses may 
become, in addition to the determination of the covered human rights, one of the ‘playthings for 
some states, and reasons for others to ignore the process’  identified by John Ruggie.14 In fact, aiming 
at such a broad scope for the Instrument may derail the negotiating process and frustrate its basic 
purpose. If accepted, there would be no mechanism of monitoring and dispute resolution capable of 
dealing with a myriad of possible cases of human rights’ violations. 
As noted, this does not mean to deny that any business enterprise should be subject to human 
rights’ obligations. The conduct of domestic businesses is regulated by national laws and 
enforcement mechanisms; unlike TNCs, they cannot wind down their economic activity in one country 
or invoke separate legal personalities to avoid their responsibility in case of human rights violations. 
There is certainly a need to ensure that the national legal regimes allow for an effective redress in 
cases where violations by domestic businesses occur, for instance by implementing the UNGPs. But 
actions taken to this end should not interfere with the elaboration of a new international treaty 
needed to hold TNCs accountable for their acts. 
It may be argued that focusing on TNCs and business enterprises engaged is transnational 
activities would mean to discriminate among businesses, since all of them should be subject to the 
same treatment. However, the elaboration of a focused Instrument would not discriminate against a 
                                                                
12
 UNGPs, p. 4. 
13
 See South News No. 93, 14 July 2015 available at http://us5.campaign-
archive2.com/?u=fa9cf38799136b5660f367ba6&id=62fa395837&e=[UNIQID. 
14
 John Ruggie, ‘Get real or we'll get nothing: Reflections on the First Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on a 
Business and Human Rights Treaty’, available at http://business-humanrights.org/en/get-real-or-well-get-nothing-reflections-
on-the-first-session-of-the-intergovernmental-working-group-on-a-business-and-human-rights-treaty. 
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category of businesses but, on the contrary, put all companies, whether domestic or not, on the same 
footing. The fact is that, unlike domestic companies, TNCs and other businesses may avoid, because 
of complex corporate and contractual structures and the international dimension of their operations, 
their responsibilities for human rights’ violations. The proposed Instrument, hence, if adopted, would 
rather ensure equality of treatment. 
4. DEFINING TNCS 
A delicate issue is whether the elaboration of the proposed Instrument would require the 
definition of the concept of ‘transnational corporations’. An attempt of introducing a definition of 
this type was made during the failed negotiations of the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations. The draft Code (1983) defined "transnational corporations" as 
“an enterprise, whether of public, private or mixed ownership, comprising entities in two or 
more countries, regardless of the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which 
operates under a system of decision-making, permitting coherent policies and a common 
strategy through one or more decision-making centres, in which the entities are so linked, 
by ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them [may be able to] exercise a significant 
influence over the activities of others, and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and 
responsibilities with the others (para. 1(a)).”15 
Other instruments relating to TNCs have explicitly opted not to define this concept. Thus, the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises state that 
 “A precise definition of multinational enterprises is not required for the purposes of the 
Guidelines. These enterprises operate in all sectors of the economy. They usually comprise 
companies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that they 
may coordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may 
be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of 
autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to 
another. Ownership may be private, State or mixed. The Guidelines are addressed to all the 
entities within the multinational enterprise (parent companies and/or local entities) (para. 
4).”16 
Similarly, the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy, indicate that  
“To serve its purpose this Declaration does not require a precise legal definition of 
multinational enterprises; this paragraph is designed to facilitate the understanding of the 
Declaration and not to provide such a definition. Multinational enterprises include 
enterprises, whether they are of public, mixed or private ownership, which own or control 
production, distribution, services or other facilities outside the country in which they are 
based. The degree of autonomy of entities within multinational enterprises in relation to 
each other varies widely from one such enterprise to another, depending on the nature of 
the links between such entities and their fields of activity and having regard to the great 
diversity in the form of ownership, in the size, in the nature and location of the operations 
of the enterprises concerned. Unless otherwise specified, the term “multinational 
enterprise” is used in this Declaration to designate the various entities (parent companies 
or local entities or both or the organization as a whole) according to the distribution of 
responsibilities among them, in the expectation that they will cooperate and provide 
                                                                
15
 Available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2891. 
16
 Available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf. 
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assistance to one another as necessary to facilitate observance of the principles laid down 
in the Declaration (para. 6).”17 
 The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition (1980) (hereinafter ‘the Set’) 
implicitly refers to TNCs as part of the definition of ‘enterprises’: 
“’Enterprises’ means firms, partnerships, corporations, companies, and includes their 
branches, subsidiaries, affiliates, or other entities directly or indirectly controlled by them 
(para. B.3)18 
The Set also prescribes that the ‘principles and rules for enterprises, including transnational 
corporations’ apply to all transactions in good and services (para.B.5).” 
Agreeing on a definition of ‘transnational corporations’ in the process of elaboration of the 
Instrument may prove to be a long and frustrating task. As suggested by the referred to instruments, 
there is no need, in fact, to provide for such a definition. It would be sufficient to arrive at a common 
understanding about the operational use of the concept by clarifying the conditions under which a 
corporation could be identified as ‘transnational’. A definition might not only be difficult to agree 
upon; it may also be too rigid to cover all possible situations and the changing dynamics of 
transnational businesses. For instance, the concept of ‘global value chains’ (GVCs), although 
developed by some academics in the 1990s, has only recently gained a prominent place at the 
negotiating tables of the main international economic fora.19 The expansion of GVCs may currently 
explain a significant part of transnational activities.20 
There are many examples of binding instruments that do not contain a definition of the basic 
concept on which such instruments are built on. For instance, the WTO General Agreement on Trade 
in Services defines when international trade in services takes place, but not the term ‘services’. The 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires the 
protection of ‘inventions’ but does not define this term either. Article 25 of the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States provides that ‘the 
jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment’ (para. 
1). In the absence of a definition, the concept has been developed through the jurisprudence relating 
to bilateral investment treaties (BITs).21 
If a definition is not contained in the proposed Instrument, alternative models may be 
followed. Under a delegation model, domestic law may play a controlling role; the international treaty 
could only contain a referral that makes its content variable depending on the determinations made 
under domestic law. Under a reliance model, the international treaty could delegate the 
characterisation of a TNC to domestic law, but retain a controlling role for its final characterisation as 
                                                                
17
 Available at http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm. 
18
 Available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf10r2.en.pdf. 
19
 See, e.g., Demian Dalle, Verónica Fossati, Federico Lavopa ‘Industrial policy and development space: the missing piece in the 
GVCs debate’, CEI, Revista Argentina de Economía Internacional, Number 2, December 2013, p.  
20
 See, e.g., Deborah K. Elms and Patrick Low (editors), Global value chains in a changing world, Fung Global Institute , Nanyang 
Technological University , World Trade Organization, 2013, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4tradeglobalvalue13_e.pdf. 
21
 Alex Grabowski, ‘The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini’, Chicago Journal of 
International Law, vol. 15, No. 1, 2014, available at 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=cjil. 
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an enterprise whose conduct is subject to the treaty rules. Another option would be to limit the 
domestic law to a supplementary role, by addressing matters not covered by the international 
treaty.22 Adopting any of these models would avoid the possibly frustrating exercise of attempting 
to define the concept of TNCs in the Instrument itself. 
5. COMPLEX STRUCTURES 
A well-known feature of TNCs is the complex structures that they create in order to engage 
in business globally. This allows them to benefit from various legal frameworks, including the 
treatment of a subsidiary under national law as a ‘domestic enterprise’ and the possibility of relying 
on different BITs to enforce their ‘investors rights’. For instance, Philip Morris initiated an investment 
case in relation to the use of tobacco brands against Uruguay through Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip 
Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay)23 relying on a BIT between 
Switzerland and Uruguay; the company sued Australia on similar grounds through Philip Morris Asia 
Limited24 relying on a BIT between Hong Kong and Australia.  
TNCs complex structures are a key element in legal maneuvering to avoid responsibility for 
the operations of formally independent companies, such as subsidiaries or sub-contractors. Many 
national laws provide examples of provisions in corporate law, tax law, investment law and 
intellectual property law aiming at regulating the activities of companies belonging to the same 
economic unit, or controlled by a dominant company. For example, the US Code of Federal 
Regulations 17 CFR 230.405 provides that 
“An affiliate is a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, 
controls or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified. 
The term control …means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause 
the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership 
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” 
In the area of intellectual property, Decision 486 of the Andean Community defines when 
persons are ‘economically associated’ as a situation where ‘one can directly or indirectly exercise a 
decisive influence on the other concerning the working of the patent, or where a third party can 
exercise such an influence on both’ (article 54). 
Under the proposed Instrument judicial authorities should have the authority to apply 
doctrines permitting them to determine the real links between formally separate entities, such as 
through ‘piercing the corporate veil’ or the doctrine of ‘single economic unit’. Such authorities should 
also be able to apply a presumption that a parent company exercises a decisive influence over the 
policy and activities of its affiliates or subsidiaries.25 The Instrument should also rule out the 
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, often invoked in common law countries to decline 
jurisdiction.  
                                                                
22
 On these different models in the framework of BITs, see, Carlos Correa and Jorge Vinuales, ‘Intellectual property rights as 
protected investments: how open are the gates?,  Journal of International Economic Law, forthcoming. 
23
 See http://www.italaw.com/cases/460. 
24
 See http://www.italaw.com/cases/851. 
25
 See, e.g., Frédérique Wenner and Bertus Van Barlingen, ‘European Court of Justice confirms Commission’s approach on 
parental liability’, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, 2010. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In order to determine the scope of the proposed Instrument, the central issue to be 
addressed is what its primary objective will be. If the aim is to resolve the issues raised by the 
international operations of TNCs (and other businesses) and their ability to commit violations in some 
countries where no redress can be effectively obtained, the negotiations should focus on filling the 
current gaps in international law. The footnote in Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/9 manifests this 
intention. The proposed binding instrument should provide a mechanism to avoid the use of complex 
corporate or contractual structures to escape the responsibility for human rights’ violations. This 
would not mean to deny that all businesses must comply with human rights obligations, but to admit 
that covering all such businesses would be a conceptually different objective with very different 
practical implications 
There is no need to agree on a definition of ‘transnational enterprises’ to develop and adopt 
the proposed Instrument. Alternative models may be applied, which have worked well in other areas 
of law, and which may allow for a swift and more effective conclusion and implementation of the new 
treaty.  In order to be effective, judicial authorities should be given the power to apply tools that 
permit them to establish the responsibility of the controlling entity, regardless of formal corporate 
or contractual structures.  
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